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The role of the Internet as a fundamental tool for communication and empowerment is one that should not be
inhibited as the limitless nature of the medium allows for a broader, unfiltered, and more democratic exchange
of information. These features become increasingly important in conditions where the mainstream media are
unwilling or unable to provide the public with the information necessary to function as democratic citizens
and maintain political accountability. Though an open Internet tends to be valued by more democratic
governments, the percentage of countries adhering to the standards of open and free media is dismally low. In
a majority of countries, governments maintain a stringent level of control over many of the mainstream
information outlets, making the Internet a vital source of alternative information for the people living within
these environments.
While media censorship is certainly not a new phenomenon, it becomes especially noteworthy when a
country experiences a sudden setback in the realms of media independence and freedom of information. Such
cases allow for a more nuanced observation of how much the public values media freedom and their
expectations of media performance. Turkey is a striking example of how a sudden dip in media freedom may
impact the social and political climate of a country.
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Foreword
By Aysenur Dal and Golnoosh Behrouzian
The role of the Internet as a fundamental tool for com-
munication and empowerment is one that should not 
be inhibited as the limitless nature of the medium al-
lows for a broader, uniltered, and more democratic 
exchange of information. These features become 
increasingly important in conditions where the main-
stream media are unwilling or unable to provide the 
public with the information necessary to function as 
democratic citizens and maintain political accountabili-
ty. Though an open Internet tends to be valued by more 
democratic governments, the percentage of countries 
adhering to the standards of open and free media is 
dismally low. In a majority of countries, governments 
maintain a stringent level of control over many of the 
mainstream information outlets, making the Internet a 
vital source of alternative information for the people liv-
ing within these environments. 
While media censorship is certainly not a new phenom-
enon, it becomes especially noteworthy when a country 
experiences a sudden setback in the realms of media 
independence and freedom of information. Such cases 
allow for a more nuanced observation of how much the 
public values media freedom and their expectations 
of media performance. Turkey is a striking example of 
how a sudden dip in media freedom may impact the 
social and political climate of a country.
Over the last couple of years, Turkey has become a 
prominent case for how a nominally democratic coun-
try can practice intensive censorship against voices 
criticizing the government. Imprisonment of journalists, 
mass irings of media personnel, issuing gag orders 
about key political events, intimidation of journalists 
through prosecution and lawsuits, imposing huge tax 
ines on media corporations, facilitating the concentra-
tion of media ownership by government supporters, 
and passing increasingly restrictive laws on media 
freedom are some of the political, economic and legal 
measures undertaken by the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) controlled government aimed at taming the 
Turkish press1. In turn, it has become quite common 
for numerous major media outlets to openly perform 
1 Corke, S., Finkel, A., Kramer, D. J., Robbins, C. A., & Schenk-
kan, N. (2014). Democracy in crisis: Corruption, media, and 
power in Turkey. Retrieved from: https://freedomhouse.org/
report/special-reports/democracy-crisis-corruption-media-and-
power-turkey
self-censorship about key political events and topics 
without an oficial publication ban on the matter. 
In addition to traditional media outlets in Turkey that 
have historically been forced to stay close to the state 
in order to survive, the Internet, too, has faced seri-
ous restrictions from the leading political authorities. 
The initial comprehensive regulation for censoring the 
Internet took place in 2007 with the desire for a “clean 
Internet”.2 The legislation not only targeted pornograph-
ic websites and downloading hosts but also websites 
like YouTube and Blogger for reasons such as promot-
ing insults to the founder of the Republic of Turkey and 
attacking political leaders. With approximately 80,000 
domain names blocked since the advent of this law, the 
government has made its position towards “dangerous” 
content circulating online clear and put Turkey in the 
limelight with respect to Internet censorship.3 
Recently, the government’s battle against social media 
attracted global attention with respect to the attacks on 
freedom of expression within the Turkish political en-
vironment. According to Twitter’s latest Transparency 
Report, 92% of the court orders for content removal in 
the irst of half of 2015 came from Turkey - a manifesta-
tion of declining tolerance for anti-government content 
circulating online.4 The 2013 national wave of protests 
that began with the Gezi Park demonstration, combined 
with the leaked wire-tapping of government oficials, 
demonstrated social media’s potential for facilitating 
anti-regime mobilization which further incentivized the 
government to place additional legal restrictions on 
channels of online communication.
In effect since February 2014, important amendments 
made to the abovementioned law have facilitated the 
censorship process in an unprecedented way.5 Namely, 
the law authorized the Telecommunications Communi-
cation Presidency (TIB) to implement blocking orders 
2 Akgül, M. & Kırlıdoğ, M. (2015). Internet censorship in Turkey. 
Retrieved from: http://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/internet-
censorship-turkey
3  ibid
4 Removal Requests/Transparency Report. Retrieved from: 
https://transparency.twitter.com/removal-requests/2015/jan-jun
5 Letsch, C. (Febraury 6, 2014). Turkey pushes through new raft 
of ‘draconian’ internet restrictions. Retrieved from: http://www.
theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/06/turkey-internet-law-censor-
ship-democracy-threat-opposition
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in four hours, obliged Internet service providers to re-
tain users’ online activity information up to two years 
and required these ISPs to to provide this data to au-
thorities upon request. Soon after these changes, TIB 
temporarily banned Twitter and YouTube shortly before 
the March 2014 national municipal elections causing 
a negative reaction from both Turkish and interna-
tional audiences.6 Ironically, a remarkable portion of 
these protests happened on Twitter by users who cir-
cumvented the ban, including the former President of 
Turkey Abdullah Gul.
Similarly, in April 2015, the URLs of Twitter and You-
Tube -as well as 166 other websites - were temporarily 
blocked under the pretext of not removing the images 
of a prosecutor with a gun pointed at his head by far-
left militants during an hostage situation.7 Facebook, 
known for complying with the content removal requests 
coming from Turkey more so than other social media 
platforms, was not subjected to such blocking due to 
their timely removal of the images. 
All in all, the global clash between citizens’ demand 
for free and open online environments and the ongo-
ing use of political/legal measures by governments to 
inhibit their availability makes the Turkish experience 
worthy of international attention. As the world keeps 
witnessing political authorities’ attempts to limit the 
Internet’s potential for disseminating critical political 
information, it is imperative for researchers to build 
an understanding of how citizens with different back-
grounds and political leanings perceive and act upon 
censorship in restrictive information environments. 
Within this context, the situation in Turkey provides an 
opportunity to observe the concepts of media freedom 
supply and demand, and better understand how these 
ideas inluence media use and information-seeking be-
havior. In this context, the “supply” of media freedom 
is characterized by the amount of media freedom an 
individual perceives they have, while “demand” for me-
dia freedom is deined by the amount of media freedom 
an individual wants or values.8 When media freedom 
6 Letsch, C. (March 28, 2014). Turkey blocks YouTube amid 
‘national security’ concerns. Retrieved from: http://www.
theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/27/google-youtube-ban-tur-
key-erdogan
7 Arango, T. (April 7, 2015). Turkey Blocks YouTube and, Briely, 
Twitter Over Hostage Photo. Retrieved from: http://www.
nytimes.com/2015/04/07/world/europe/turkey-blocks-twitter-
youtube-and-sites-that-published-hostage-photo.html
8 Nisbet, E. C., & Stoycheff, E. (2013). Let the people speak: a 
multilevel model of supply and demand for press freedom. Com-
munication Research, 40(5), 720-741.
demand outweighs media freedom supply, a deicit 
forms, resulting in potential dissatisfaction with the me-
dia system. The effects of a perceived media freedom 
deicit may manifest into more complex psychological 
responses related to restoring the individual’s freedom 
to access information. In instances where a media 
freedom deicit is evident to an individual, he or she 
may become motivated to not only reestablish ac-
cess to media freedoms that have been limited by the 
government, but also to resist media discourse be-
ing propagated by the censored source. Yet another 
reaction could be a deepening silence in face of ris-
ing pressure from the government. Such silence could 
manifest itself in strategic switching to not only alterna-
tive media sources but also other relatively less risky 
activities on the Internet that would keep individuals out 
of the regulatory radar screen.
Media censorship not only impacts the consumption 
habits of the public, but it can inluence the type of 
information to which people become exposed. Spe-
ciically, people who feel that mainstream media is 
too constrained may turn to the Internet for informa-
tion based on the perception that it is more open and 
pluralistic. Therefore, the type of information acquired 
through online sources becomes an important consid-
eration, as well. Research suggests that information 
from the Internet provides two distinct perspectives 
for citizens. The irst is one that allows people to re-
lect upon the situation and environment in their own 
country through a process called “mirror holding”. The 
second approach affords people the opportunity to bet-
ter understand events and situations in other countries 
in comparison to their own, by way of a “window open-
ing” approach.9 Both of these tactics permit individuals 
to learn and evolve within their particular environment. 
Keeping in mind the aforementioned theoretical con-
cepts and applying them to the media conditions 
in Turkey, we are able to develop a more integrated 
approach to analyzing the importance of Internet cen-
sorship and how citizens view and respond to this 
obstacle. While there is much to be desired in this area 
of research, these reports bring us one step closer to 
understanding the nuanced perceptions of Internet 
censorship in a global context. 
9 Bailard, C. (2014). Democracy’s Double-Edged Sword: How 
Internet Use Changes Citizens’ Views of their Government. 
Bethesda, MD: Johns Hopkins Press
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Executive Summary of Survey Results
Profile of Turkish Internet Users 
The percentage of survey respondents identifying 
themselves as Internet users was 51% with 36% of 
Turkish citizens reporting they use the Internet every 
day. Non-users of the Internet are marked by being 
older, women, lower educated, from larger household 
size, having lower monthly household income, more 
likely to be Kurdish than the general population, are 
more religious, and are more likely to identify as Justice 
and Development Party (AKP) supporters. 
In comparison, those who use the Internet everyday 
are very young, are more likely to be male, have higher 
rates of secondary school and some college attain-
ment, have smaller household size and high household 
incomes, are more likely to identify primarily as Turkish, 
are more secular, and are more likely to either identify 
with the People’s Republican Party (CHP) or no party 
at all. 
The most frequent use of the Internet is accessing on-
line social networking platform such as Facebook or 
Twitter (91% all Internet users). This is followed by 
downloading or listening to music online (81% of In-
ternet users) and downloading or watching videos, 
movies, or TV shows (79% of Internet users). Approxi-
mately two-thirds of Internet users use Internet sources 
such as blogs, websites, and social media for news at 
least once a month. The least popular online activity is 
buying or ordering goods and services (33% of Internet 
users report doing so at least once a month).
The top ive most popular social networking sites 
among Turkish Internet users is Facebook, followed by 
Google+, YouTube, Twitter, and Instagram. Four out of 
ive Turkish social media users read news headlines or 
short news summaries via social media at least once 
a month and three out of ive look at videos or images 
about political leaders or parties at least once a month 
on social media. Nearly half of Turkish social media 
users report discussing political issues with others, 
sharing news stories or videos, or liking, posting, com-
menting on anything related to politics at least once a 
month. 
Turkish Information Policy Literacy
Survey respondents were asked four true/false ques-
tions testing their knowledge on media and Internet 
policies in Turkey as a means to evaluate their policy 
literacy about freedom of expression issues. Half of 
Turkish citizens correctly rated as false that Turkey 
has fewer journalists in jail as compared to most coun-
tries. Approximately one third of respondents correctly 
rated as false that the National Intelligence Agency 
may only access citizen data with a court order. The 
Supreme Council of Radio and Television Broadcasts 
(RTUK) law allowing the prime minister or a minister 
appointed by him to temporarily halt broadcasts when 
national security or public order is under threat was 
correctly identiied as true by one third of respondents. 
Twenty-nine percent of Turkish citizens correctly knew 
that Turkish ISPs are required to collect user data for 
two years and provide the government the data on de-
mand. Overall, on a scale ranging from zero to four, the 
mean correct score was 1.4 for all respondents.
Turkish Evaluations of Internet 
 Content
About one-quarter of all Turkish citizens are satisied 
or very satisied with the quality of the Internet in Tur-
key while this number rises to one-third among heavy 
Internet users. However, forty-percent of all Turkish 
citizens, as well as heavy Internet users, are either un-
satisied or very unsatisied with the Internet in Turkey. 
Beyond feeling dissatisied, pluralities of Turkish 
citizens feel that the social media threatens different 
social, cultural, and political elements in Turkey. In gen-
eral two out ive Turkish citizens believe social media 
threatens families, is being used to spread false rumors 
about political leaders, promotes Western values over 
Turkish ones, is being used against Turkey by foreign 
countries, threatens Islamic teachings and beliefs, and 
increases the threat of terrorism. However, a plurality of 
Turkish citizens (roughly again two out of ive) disagree 
that social media threatens Turkey’s political stability. 
Though among heavy Internet users these perceptions 
were less prevalent, one-third of heavy Internet users 
still agreed that social media presented a general men-
ace to society. 
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Turkish Demand for Internet 
 Freedom
Two out of ive people living in Turkey believe the 
Internet should be completely free of government cen-
sorship while a bit over a quarter disagree with this 
viewpoint. Among heavy Internet users the number 
of respondents desiring a completely free and open 
Internet rises to one out of two. Opinion also varies 
considerably by political party support, with over half 
of People’s Republican Party (CHP) supporters prefer-
ring a complete uncensored Internet while the plurality 
of the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
supporters prefers a censored Internet. 
About one in ive Turkish citizens support recent restric-
tions placed on the Internet by the Turkish government 
in 2014 as compared to nearly half of all respondents 
who oppose them. The percentage of Turkish citizens 
opposing recent government restrictions on the Inter-
net rises to nearly two-thirds among heavy Internet 
users. Attitudes again vary by political afiliation. Three 
quarters of CHP supporters oppose recent government 
restrictions on the Internet while the plurality of AKP 
supporters, about 40%, favors the restrictions. 
The vast majority of Respondents (seven out of ten) 
agree that pornographic or sexually explicit Internet 
content should be censored by the government. There 
is also strong support across all amounts of Internet 
use for censoring online content that criticizes Islam. 
In contrast, there is little support for censoring politi-
cal information such as online content that attacks the 
government or advocates minority rights among Turk-
ish citizens. On other topics, such as online content 
that damages political leaders’ reputations or insults 
Turkish national values or history, respondents tend to 
evenly divide on whether to censor or not. 
Support for online censorship of speciic topics varies 
considerably by party afiliation in Turkey. Supporters 
of the center-right AKP and Nationalist Movement Party 
(MHP) heavily favor censoring online content that criti-
cizes Islam while the plurality of center-left CHP and 
People’s Democratic Party (HDP) supporters oppose 
censorship of such content. A similar ideological divide 
exists among Turkish citizens when asked whether 
online content that insults Turkish national values and 
history should be censored. 
In terms of online political content, the plurality of AKP 
supporters favor censoring online content that damag-
es political leader’s reputations or is used to organize 
anti-government protests. However, at the same time, 
pluralities of AKP supporters oppose censoring online 
content that attacks the government or advocates for 
minority rights. In contrast, supporters of the three 
opposition parties (CHP, MHP, HDP) are all heavily 
opposed to censoring any of these forms of online con-
tent with the greater intensity of opposition coming from 
supporters of the CHP, the largest opposition party. 
Survey respondents were asked their agreement with 
four statements: a) online blogs and social media criti-
cizing the government should be free from government 
censorship, b) citizens should be free from coercion 
and violence when discussing and conveying con-
troversial issues online, c) citizens should be free to 
access government information online, and d) anyone 
in Turkey should be able to have a website, blog, or 
share content online. 
Nearly two-thirds of respondents demand that citi-
zens be free from government coercion and violence 
when expressing opinions online. A similar percentage 
demands that online blogs and social media be free 
from government censorship. Six out of ten people liv-
ing in Turkey also agree that that anyone should be 
able have a presence online and that Turkish citizens 
should have access to government information online. 
These levels of support for basic Internet freedom are 
the same across a range of demographic character-
istics including frequency of Internet use and political 
party support. 
Perceived Supply of Turkish Internet 
Freedom
Nearly half of Turkish citizens perceive the Internet 
as censored/very censored in Turkey as compared to 
about one third who perceive it to be free/very free. 
Among heavy Internet users the percentage of re-
spondents who perceive the Internet as censored/very 
censored rises to almost two-thirds. Perceptions of 
Internet censorship are also highly divergent between 
political parties. Half of AKP supporters perceive the 
Internet as free/very free in Turkey while seven out of 
ten CHP supporters perceive it as censored/very cen-
sored. The majority of the supporters of the other two 
major opposition parties, the MHP and HDP, also per-
ceive the Internet as censored/very censored. 
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Government online surveillance and high proile pros-
ecutions of journalists, celebrities, and average citizens 
for anti-government online comments have created 
concerns in Turkey about online privacy and political 
expression. One-third of Turkish Internet users agree 
that they avoid certain websites, blogs, and online con-
versations. Another third of Internet users are afraid to 
openly share with others online what they think about 
some political topics. Two out of ive Internet users wor-
ry about their privacy when using commercial websites. 
However these privacy concerns vary considerably by 
party support. “Majorities of AKP supporters disagree 
that they avoid certain websites, blogs, and online con-
versations due to online monitoring by the government 
and are afraid to openly share with others online what
they think about some political topics. In comparison, 
opposition supporters (CHP, MHP, HDP) are much 
more likely to state that they avoid certain websites, 
blogs, and online conversations due to online surveil-
lance and are are afraid to openly share with others 
online what they think about some political topics
On questions regarding opinions about speciic inter-
net freedom issues  in Turkey, the survey respondents 
were highly split. Turkish citizens are evenly divided on 
whether citizens are free or not from government coer-
cion and violence when discussing controversial topics 
online or whether they have free and open access to 
government information online. Pluralities of Turkish 
citizens do agree that the government does not prevent 
citizens from criticizing the government on online blogs 
and social media and that anyone in Turkey may have 
a website, blog, or share content online. 
Pluralities of AKP supporters perceive the Internet as 
free on each of these questions. In contrast, pluralities 
of opposition party supporters (CHP, MHP, HDP) do not 
believe citizens are free from government coercion and 
violence when discussing controversial topics online or 
that citizens have free and open access to government 
information online. However, pluralities of opposition 
party supporters do agree with AKP supporters that the 
government does not prevent citizens from criticizing 
it in online blogs and social media and that anyone in 
Turkey may have a website, blog, or share content on-
line.
Democratic Deficit in Turkish 
 Internet Freedom
Comparing how much Internet freedom Turkish citi-
zens want to how much they perceive as possessing, 
several gaps, or democratic deicits, appear. Respon-
dents perceive the biggest democratic deicits on 
questions of government coercion and violence toward 
citizens discussing controversial topics online and of 
accessing government information online. There is a 
substantial difference in perceptions of democratic def-
icits between heavy Internet users and non-users, with 
the size of perceived democratic deicits among heavy 
Internet users on average two to three times that of 
non-users. The overall democratic deicit of AKP sup-
porters is three times less than the average Turk, ive 
times less than CHP supporters, four times less than 
MHP supporters, and three times less than HDP sup-
porters.
Internet Blockage and 
 Circumvention
Roughly a quarter of the Turkish public report knowing 
a great deal about the YouTube and Twitter blockages 
that began in March 2014. Another roughly quarter of 
survey respondents is familiar with the blockages but 
did not know all the details. The remainder of respon-
dents, comprising a bit over half the population, had 
heard something or nothing at all. However, awareness 
of the bans varied substantially by frequency of Internet 
and social media usage. Half of heavy Internet users 
reported knowing a great deal about the blockage of 
Twitter compared to less than one in ten non-users. For 
the YouTube blockage the pattern was the same. Over 
half of Twitter users reported knowing a great deal and 
another quarter reported being familiar about the Twit-
ter blockage in Turkey. About half of YouTube users 
reported knowing a great deal about the YouTube ban 
in Turkey and a quarter of YouTube users also reported 
being familiar with the ban but not knowing all the de-
tails.
About half of all Turkish citizens strongly disapprove/
disapprove of both the Twitter and YouTube blockages 
by the Turkish government. At the same time about one 
in six Turkish citizens supported the banning of these 
two platforms. The remaining roughly third of Turkish 
citizens in each case either neither approved nor disap-
proved of the bans or replied it was too dificult to tell. 
The blockage of Twitter and YouTube were deeply un-
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popular among heavy Internet users with nearly seven 
out of ten heavy users in each case strongly disapprov-
ing/disapproving of the bans. Likewise three-fourths of 
Twitter users and two-thirds of YouTube users strongly 
disapproved/disapproved of the government blocking. 
The blockage of these two social media platforms was 
deeply polarizing, not only between supporters of the 
ruling AKP party and the opposition parties but also 
among AKP supporters themselves. About one in three 
AKP supporters favored the government blocking Twit-
ter and YouTube. However, at the same time nearly a 
quarter of AKP supporters also opposed the bans in 
each case. Disapproval of the blockages was very high 
among supporters of the opposition parties and those 
with no party afiliation, while at the same time approval 
was extremely low. Nearly three-fourth of CHP support-
ers disapproved of the blockages as well as majorities 
of and HDP supporters and those with no party afilia-
tion.
Eight out of ten Turkish Internet users reported not 
circumventing the blockages of either YouTube or Twit-
ter. One in ten Internet users reported circumventing 
the bans occasionally while one in twenty did so a fair 
amount and another one in twenty did so all the time. 
Among Twitter and YouTube users speciically, the re-
ported frequency of circumvention was signiicantly 
higher with about one in ten YouTube and Twitter users 
reporting they circumvented the blockages all the time. 
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FIGURE 1: TURKISH FREQUENCY OF INTERNET USE (percentage of total respondents)
Profile of Turkish Internet Users
Over the ive year period between 2009 and 2013, the 
percentage of Turkish citizens using the Internet in-
creased by 28% (growing from 36% in 2009 to 46% 
in 2013).10 Our survey results are consistent with this 
trend with 51% of respondents identifying themselves 
as Internet users. Respondents to the survey may be 
split into three segments based on their frequency of 
Internet use (see Figure 1). The largest segment is 
non-users of the Internet and account for 49% of the 
Turkish adult population. The second largest segment 
of the adult population (36%) is people who report us-
ing the Internet every day. Turkish adults who use the 
Internet ranging anywhere from less than once a month 
to two to three times a week make up 15% of the Turk-
ish population.
Table 1 provides the demographic and social proile of 
our three Internet use segments in Turkey. Non-users of 
the Internet are marked by being older (35% over 55), 
women (57%), lower educated (68% primary schooling 
or less), larger household size (3.7 persons on aver-
age), lower monthly household income (1465 TR), are 
more likely to be Kurdish than the general population 
(22%), are more religious (55% high religiosity), and 
more likely to identify as Justice and Development Par-
ty (AKP) supporters (47%). 
10 International Telecommunication Union ICT Indicators 2014 
Database 
In comparison, Turkish citizens who use the Internet 
every day are very young (58% less than 34 years old), 
are more likely to be male (57%), have higher rates of 
secondary school (51%) and some college attainment 
(38%), have smaller household size (3.2 persons), 
high household incomes (2363 TR), are more likely to 
identify primarily as Turkish (87%), are more secular 
(59% low or moderate religiosity), and are more likely 
to either identify with the People’s Republican Party 
(29%) or no party at all (30%). Light Internet users tend 
to relect the proile of heavy Internet users more so 
than non-users except they tend to be more conserva-
tive socially (51% report high religiosity) and politically 
(38% identify with Justice and Development Party). 
Internet users were asked how frequently they en-
gage in nine different forms of online activities. Table 
2 provides the percentage of respondents overall and 
within each Internet use segment that reported engag-
ing in each activity regularly at least once a month or 
more. The most frequent use of the Internet among 
both heavy Internet users (93%) and light Internet us-
ers (85%) in Turkey is using online social networking 
platform such as Facebook or Twitter (91% of all In-
ternet users). There is a much larger divide between 
heavy and light Internet use segments when it comes 
to downloading or listening to music online (67% of 
light users vs. 87% of heavy users) and downloading 
or watching videos, movies, or TV shows (58% of light 
users vs. 87% of heavy users). 
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TABLE 1: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERNET USE SEGMENTS (percentage of total respondents)
Frequency of Internet Use
Demographic Category Non-Users Light Users Heavy Users All Respondents
Age
% 18-34 years old 24 52 58 40
 % 35-54 years old 41 42 38 40
% 55 or more years old 35 6 4 20
Gender
 % Men 43 59 57 50
% Women 57 41 43 50
Educational Attainment
% Primary education or less 68 22 11 41
% Secondary or high school 28 57 51 41
% Some college or more 4 21 38 19
Household Characteristics
Monthly Household Income (TR per month) 1465 2292 2363 1911
Mean Household Size (persons) 3.7 3.4 3.2 3.4
Monthly Household Income Per Person 396 674 738 562
Primary Ethnicity
% Turkish 74 85 87 80
% Kurdish 22 13 10 16
% Other 4 2 3 4
Muslim Religiosity
% Low 16 21 26 20
% Moderate 29 29 33 31
% High 55 51 41 49
Party Identiication
% Justice and Development Party (AKP) 47 38 29 39
% People’s Republican Party (CHP) 16 23 23 19
% Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) 7 11 10 9
% People’s Democratic Party (HDP) 9 8 7 8
% No party identiication 22 20 30 25
The other stark contrasts between Internet use seg-
ments appear in the frequency of emailing with friends 
and family (63% of light users and 82% of heavy us-
ers), how often they post comments/entries on blogs or 
news websites (43% of light users and 64% of heavy 
users), and frequency of searching online for informa-
tion about political leaders or topics (41% of light users 
vs. 62% of heavy users). When it comes to using the 
Internet as a news source (51% of light users and 69% 
of heavy users), playing games online (53% of light 
users and 66% of heavy users), and buying/ordering 
goods or services online (25% of light users vs. 36% of 
heavy users) the differences between heavy and light 
Internet users are much smaller.
As social networking sites (SNS) are used by 91% of 
Internet users at least once a month, we asked survey 
respondents which speciic SNS they used and how 
frequently they engaged in a several forms of informa-
tion-seeking and expression activities on SNS. The top 
SNS (for which at least 5% of Internet users reported 
using) are listed in Figure 2 along with the percentage 
of light and heavy Internet users that reported using 
the site. 
Facebook is by far the most popular SNS with 92% of 
heavy Internet users and 87% of light Internet citing its 
use. The next most popular SNS are Google+, cited by 
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TABLE 2: ONLINE ACTIVITIES ONCE A MONTH OR 
MORE BY INTERNET USE SEGMENTS (percentage of 
Internet users)
Frequency of 
Internet Use
Type of Internet Activity % of 
Light 
Users
% of 
Heavy 
Users
% of All 
Internet 
Users
Use online social network-
ing platforms such as 
 Facebook or Twitter
85 93 91
Download or listen to 
music
67 87 81
Download/watch videos, 
movies, TV shows
58 87 79
Send/receive email w/ 
friends and family
63 82 76
Use Internet sources 
(blogs, websites, social 
media) for news
51 69 64
Play games online 53 66 62
Post comments/entries on 
blog or news website
43 64 58
Search for information on 
political leaders or topics
41 62 55
Buy/order goods or ser-
vices
25 36 33
TABLE 3: SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORM ACTIVITIES ONCE 
A MONTH OR MORE BY INTERNE USE SEGMENTS 
(percentage of Internet users)
Frequency of Internet Use
Type of Social Media 
Activity
% of 
Light 
Users
% of 
Heavy 
Users
% of All 
Social 
Media 
Users
Information-seeking behaviors
Read news headlines or 
short news summaries
76 86 81
Look at videos or images 
about political leaders or 
parties
58 61 60
Read political opinions 
about political leaders or 
issues
58 60 59
Read messages from, or 
proiles of, political leaders 
or parties
51 55 53
Political expression behaviors
Discuss political issues with 
others
47 45 46
Share news stories or 
videos automatically that 
you view on news websites 
or blogs
49 42 46
Like, post or comment on 
anything related to politics, 
including news stories, 
opinions, images, or videos
50 40 45
Recruit people to get in-
volved with political issues
39 28 34
61% of heavy users and 51% of light users, and You-
Tube which has a similar split between heavy (61%) 
and light (47%) users. The fourth most popular social 
networking site in Turkey is Twitter with about two in 
ive heavy Internet users (44%) and one in three light 
users (32%) reporting using the platform. Instagram is 
ifth place with one in four (27%) of heavy users and 
17% of light users on the platform. The last two SNS for 
which at least 5% of Internet users reported using are 
Ekşi Sözlük11 (13% of heavy and 8% of light users) and 
Vine (6% of both heavy and light users). 
11 Ekşi Sözlük is a collaborative hypertext ‘dictionary’ based on 
about 55 thousand volunteer contributors. It has a dual use 
with thousands sharing information on various topics ranging 
from science to to everyday life issues as well as being used 
as a virtual socio-political community to communicate disputed 
political contents and to share personal views. See Hatice Akca 
(2005). The Internet as a participatory medium: An analysis 
of the Eksi Sozluk website as a public sphere (M.A. disserta-
tion thesis). University of South Carolina. Similarly Vine is a 
short-form video sharing service wherein users can share six 
second-long video clips.
In addition to asking what SNS Turkish citizens use, 
we also asked how frequently they engaged in eight 
forms of political information-seeking and expression 
activities on their social media sites to which they be-
long. Social media users were divided into categories 
of heavy social media users (use social media every-
day - 49% of users) and light social media users (use 
social media 2-3 times a week or less – 51% of users). 
Table 3 provides the percentage of light, heavy, and all 
social media users that reported regularly engaging in 
the listed behavior at least once a month or more often.
Among information-seeking behaviors we queried, 
the most frequent activity (81% of all Internet users) 
on social media was reading news headlines or short 
news summaries. There are substantial differences 
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FIGURE 2: SOCIAL MEDIA NETWORK USE (percentage of Internet users, multiple responses)
by frequency of Internet use, with 76% of light users 
as compared to 86% of heavy users reporting engag-
ing in this the activity at least once a month. The least 
frequently reported information-seeking activity was 
reading messages from or proiles of political lead-
ers or parties (53% of all users) though with a much 
smaller differences between light (51%) and heavy us-
ers (55%). As one may expect, a pattern that emerges 
is that more heavy social media users are somewhat 
more likely to engage in these information-seeking be-
haviors than light users. 
Across different types of social media users, the num-
ber of users who discuss political issues with others 
(46%), clicking a “share” button to automatically share 
news stories or videos from website or blogs (46%), 
and like political posts or comments (45%) on social 
media platforms at least once a month was about the 
same. However, compared to information-seeking be-
haviors, the pattern of differences between light and 
heavy social media users is reversed when considering 
political expression on social media. Light users com-
pared to heavy users of social media are signiicantly 
more likely to report shared news stories or videos from 
website or blogs automatically (49% vs. 42%), liking 
political posts or comments (50% vs. 40%), and recruit-
ing people to get involved with political issues (39% 
vs. 28%). In other words, heavy users appear to seek 
more information while light users appear to have more 
political expression behaviors on the web. 
Page 14
BENCHMARKING DEMAND: TURKEY’S CONTESTED INTERNET                                                                                              OCTOBER 2015
Turkish Information Policy Literacy
FIGURE 3: MEAN POLICY LITERACY BY POLITICAL 
PARTY (percentage of total respondents, single reponse)
Survey respondents were asked four true/false ques-
tions testing their knowledge on media and Internet 
policies in Turkey as a means of evaluating their policy 
literacy about freedom of expression issues in Turkey. 
The statements they were asked to rate as true or false 
were: a) Turkey has fewer journalists in jail than most 
countries (false), b) Internet service providers (ISPs) 
are required to collect all data on Internet user’s activi-
ties for up to two years, and to provide authorities with 
the data in question on demand (true), c) The Supreme 
Council and Television Broadcasts (RTUK) law allows 
the prime minister or a minister appointed by him to 
temporarily halt broadcasts when national security or 
public order is under threat (true), d) the National In-
telligence Agency (MIT) may only access a citizen’s 
private data with a court order (false).
Overall, 50% of respondents correctly rated as false 
that Turkey has fewer journalists in jail than most coun-
tries while about one third (32%) of Turkish citizens 
correctly rated as false that the MIT may only access 
citizen data with a court order. About one-third (31%) 
of people living in Turkey also knew that the RTUK law 
allows the government to halt broadcasts when there 
is national security emergency or public order is un-
der threat and a smaller number of (29%) of Turkish 
citizens correctly rate as true that ISPs are required to 
collect user data for two years and provide the govern-
ment the data on demand. 
Examining answers across frequency of Internet use, 
there is only signiicant variation between user seg-
ments on the question of Turkish journalists in jail. 
Almost two-thirds (61%) of heavy Internet users cor-
rectly rated as false that Turkey has fewer journalists 
in jail as compared to most countries while 53% of light 
users and 41% of non-users did the same. 
Tallying the total number of correct answers per re-
spondent allows us to score each respondent’s general 
policy literacy on a 0-4 scale. Figure 6 present the mean 
scores for this scale for all respondents as well as for 
each group of party supporters. The mean score of cor-
rect answers for all Turkish citizens was 1.4. However, 
there was substantial variation in mean scores across 
groups of party supporters. Supporters of the opposi-
tion CHP party had the highest mean score of all the 
political parties with an average of 1.6 answers correct 
out of four. The next highest scoring political groups 
were MHP supporters (1.5 avg. score) and those who 
do not support any party (1.5 avg. score). The lowest 
scoring groups were AKP and HDP supporters who 
each answered 1.3 out of four knowledge questions 
correctly. 
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Turkish Evaluations of Internet Content
FIGURE 4: SATISFACTION WITH QUALITY OF INTERNET IN TURKEY (percentage of 
total respondents)
Survey respondents were queried on how satisied or 
unsatisied they were with the quality of the websites 
and social media available in Turkey. Across all re-
spondents, Internet users and non-users alike, about 
one-quarter (26%) were either very satisied or satis-
ied with the quality of the web in Turkey. The plurality, 
40%, were neither satisied nor unsatisied with its 
quality and about one-third of respondents (34%) were 
either unsatisied or very unsatisied with the quality of 
websites and social media available in Turkey. 
Among light and heavy Internet users satisfaction with 
the quality of available websites and social media in 
Turkey varies. The plurality of heavy Internet users 
(39%) are either unsatisied or very unsatisied with 
the quality of Turkish websites and social media as 
compared to 35% who state they are satisied or very 
satisied. The plurality of light users (36%) are neither 
satisied nor unsatisied with Internet quality, though a 
higher percentage of light users (34%) are unsatisied/
very unsatisied with the quality of websites and social 
media as compared to those who are satisied/very sat-
isied (30%).
Beyond overall satisfaction with the quality of the In-
ternet in Turkey, Turkish citizens were also asked if 
the social media websites like Facebook, Twitter, and 
YouTube posed a threat across nine different dimen-
sions, namely a) threating family values b) being used 
to wrongly spread rumors and lies about public igures, 
c) promoting Western values more so than Turkish val-
ues, d) being used by foreign countries against Turkey, 
e) threatening Islamic teachings and values, f) increas-
ing the threat of terrorism inside Turkey, g) is a general 
menace to society, h) increases the rate of suicides, 
i) is a threat to political stability. Figure 5 provides the 
percentages of respondents that agreed, disagreed, or 
were indifferent to these perceived threats of the Inter-
net. 
Substantial numbers of people residing in Turkey 
believe that social media threatens family values 
(44%), is used wrongly to spread false rumors and 
lies about public igures (43%), promotes Western 
values more so than Turkish values (41%), is used 
by foreign countries against Turkey (41%), threatens 
Islamic teachings and beliefs (40%), and increases 
the threat of terrorism inside Turkey (38%). Turkish 
citizens were rather more polarized on the questions 
of whether social media increased the rate of sui-
cides in Turkey (35% agreed vs. 34% disagreeing) 
and threatened political stability (33% agreed vs. 37% 
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FIGURE 5: SATISFACTION WITH QUALITY OF INTERNET IN TURKEY BY IN FREQUENCY 
OF INTERNET USER (percentage of total respondents)
disagreed). Relecting the political divisions within 
Turkey, 35% agreed with President Erdogan’s 2013 
assertion that social media was a general menace 
to society while 33% disagreed with his assessment. 
However, opinions about these possible threats from 
the Internet vary substantially across the three Internet 
use segments as exhibited in Table 4, with non-us-
ers substantially more likely to view the Internet as 
threatening in general as compared to light and heavy 
Internet users. For instance, a plurality of Internet non-
users (49%) agree that social media threatens family 
values whereas pluralities of light (46%) and heavy 
(42%) Internet users disagree. 
Likewise, almost half of non-users (45%) believe social 
media threatens Islamic teachings and beliefs while the 
plurality of light (39%) and heavy (44%) Internet users 
think otherwise. The biggest divisions across Internet 
use segments were on the questions of whether social 
media threatened political stability (34% of non-users 
agreed vs. 49% of heavy Internet users disagreed), 
social media increased the rate of suicides (39% of 
non-users agreed vs. 46% of heavy Internet users 
disagreed), and whether social media was overall a 
general menace to society (38% of non-users agreed 
vs. 45% of heavy Internet users disagreed).
However, there was also agreement across all levels of 
Internet use on some aspects of social media that Turk-
ish citizens found threatening. For example, pluralities 
of non-users (43%), light users (46%), and heavy us-
ers (43%) believed that social media was used wrongly 
to spread false rumors and lies about public igures. 
There was also a great deal of agreement, similarly, 
across Internet use segments that social media pro-
motes Western values more so than Turkish values 
(41% of non-users, 46% of light users, and 39% of 
heavy users agreed) and that it increased the threat of 
terrorism inside Turkey (40% of non-users, 40% of light 
users, and 38% of heavy users agreed).In short, Inter-
net is primarily seen as a threat by non-users.
Page 17
OCTOBER 2015                                                                                           BENCHMARKING DEMAND: TURKEY’S CONTESTED INTERNET
FIGURE 6: PERCEIVED THREAT FROM THE SOCIAL MEDIA
TABLE 4: PERCEIVED THREAT FROM THE SOCIAL MEDIA BY FREQUENCY OF INTERNET USE (percentage of total 
respondents, single response)
Frequency of Internet Use
Type of Threat % of Non-Users
Agree/Disagree
% of Light Users
Agree/Disagree
% of Heavy Users
Agree/Disagree
Socio-Cultural Threats of Social Media
Threatens family values 49 21 24 46 37 42
Promotes Western values more so than Turkish 
values
41 19 46 21 39 35
Threatens Islamic teachings and beliefs 45 26 30 39 34 44
Increases the rate of suicides 39 26 30 37 32 46
A general menace to society 38 23 36 39 32 45
Political Threats of Social Media
Used by foreign countries against Turkey 43 22 40 28 36 40
Used wrongly spread false rumors and lies 
about public igures
43 17 46 27 43 34
Increases the threat of terrorism inside Turkey 40 25 40 33 38 33
Threat to political stability 34 27 35 39 30 49
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Turkish Demand for Internet Freedom
FIGURE 7: AGREEMENT WITH INTERNET ENTIRELY FREE FROM CENSORSHIP 
BY FREQUENCY OF INTERNET USE SEGMENTS (percentage of total respon-
dents, single reponse) 
Survey respondents were asked two different sets of 
questions about Internet censorship and freedom. The 
irst asked respondents to assess demand for Internet 
freedom (how much Internet freedom they wanted) 
while the second set of questions asked respondents to 
assess the perceived supply (how much Internet free-
dom they enjoyed) in Turkey.12 By comparing demand 
for Internet freedom with perceived supply in Turkey, 
we can assess the degree of to which there is a demo-
cratic deicit (demand outweighing supply) of Internet 
freedom in Turkey from a citizen perspective. Respon-
dents were irst asked an overarching question about 
whether they agreed or disagreed with having the In-
12  see Nisbet, E.C. & Stoycheff, E. (2013). Let the people 
speak: a multi-level model of supply and demand for press 
freedom. Communication Research. 40(5), 720-741 doi: 
10.1177/0093650211429117
ternet entirely free from censorship. Figure 7 depicts 
their preference by frequency of Internet use segment.
Overall, 39% of Turkish citizens believe the Internet 
should be completely free of government censorship 
while a bit over a quarter (29%) disagrees with this 
viewpoint. Though as Figure 7 depicts, there is substan-
tial variation by frequency of Internet use. For example, 
53% of heavy Internet users believe the Internet should 
be completely free compared to 37% of light users and 
29% of non-users. Interestingly, a higher percentage of 
light Internet users (36%) disagreed with a completely 
uncensored Internet than heavy users (23%) or non-
users (30%). 
In recent years, Internet censor-
ship has become a highly politically 
polarized issue in Turkey, and is 
viewed by many afiliated with the 
AKP dominated government as a 
major tool of the political opposi-
tion. This polarization is relected 
in Figure 8 which depicts the dis-
tribution of opinion about Internet 
censorship by political party sup-
port.
A majority (56%) of CHP sup-
porters agree with a completely 
uncensored Internet (56%) fol-
lowed by pluralities of MHP and 
HDP supporters (each 47%) while 
about a quarter of supporters in 
each party disagree. In contrast to 
these opposition parties, AKP sup-
porters are the least likely (27%) to 
support a completely open Internet 
and in fact a plurality of AKP sup-
porters (37%) disagrees with this 
view. Turkish citizens who do not 
support any party are equally split 
into those who agree with a com-
pletely free Internet and those who 
are ambivalent (38% each) and a 
smaller percentage who disagree 
(23%). 
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FIGURE 8: AGREEMENT WITH INTERNET ENTIRELY FREE FROM CENSORSHIP 
OF INTERNET CENSORSHIP BY POLITICAL PARTY SUPPORT (percentage of total 
respondents, single reponse)  
In 2014, the Turkish parliament initiated new legisla-
tion that placed several new restrictions on Internet 
content, gave additional powers to the government to 
block websites without court orders, and required Inter-
net providers to make available two years of user data 
immediately upon request.13,14 Therefore ,a second 
survey question asked respondents more speciically 
about whether they generally supported or opposed re-
cent Internet restrictions and censorship initiated by the 
Turkish government. 
Figure 9 shows the distribution of support for these 
restrictions by frequency of Internet use. Overall sup-
port for these recent restrictions on users is low with 
13 “Turkey pushes through new raft of ‘draconian’ internet restric-
tions,” Constanze Letsch, The Guardian, 6 February 2014, 
Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/06/
turkey-internet-law-censorship-democracy-threat-opposition
14 “The Struggle for Turkey’s Internet” special report by Freedom 
House; see https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-reports/
struggle-turkeys-internet
22% of Turkish citizens supporting the government’s 
censorship compared to 48% of Turkish citizens op-
posing it and 30% of Turkish citizens indifferent to it. 
Almost two-thirds of heavy Internet users (63%) and 
nearly one-half (49%) of light Internet users oppose the 
government’s recent censorship of the Internet while 
in comparison 19% and 17% support it, respectively. A 
plurality of non-users (38%) also opposes the Turkish 
government’s recent restrictions on Internet freedom 
while about one-quarter (25%) support it.
Support for recent restrictions on Internet freedom by 
the Turkish government is also highly polarized by 
political party support as Figure 10 illustrates. Nearly 
three-fourths (74%) of CHP supporters and two-thirds 
(62%) of MHP supporters oppose the government’s 
censorship of the Internet while only about one-in-ten 
in each party (9% in CHP and 10% in MHP) support it. 
Though a plurality (38%) of AKP supporters back the 
government’s recent Internet censorship a sizable per-
centage (28%) also oppose it.
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FIGURE 9: SUPPORT FOR RECENT GOVERNMENT RESTRICTIONS ON INTERNET 
BY FREQUENCY OF INTERNET USE SEGMENTS (percentage of total respondents, 
single response)
The next set of questions posed to respondents asked 
whether they agreed or disagreed with the government 
censoring different types of Internet content, speciical-
ly: a) content that advocates minority rights; b) content 
that attacks the government; c) pornographic or sexu-
ally explicit content; d) content that damages political 
leaders’ reputation, e) content that criticizes Islam, f) 
content used to organize protests against the govern-
ment; h) content that insults Turkish national values 
or history. Table 5 provides the percentage of Turk-
ish citizens who agree, disagree, or neither agree nor 
disagree that each type of Internet content should be 
censored by the Turkish government by frequency of 
Internet use. 
The vast majority of Turkish citizens across all Inter-
net use segments (about 70% in each segment) agree 
that pornographic or sexually explicit Internet content 
should be censored. There is also very little variance 
by frequency of Internet use in the percentage of Turk-
ish citizens who support government censorship of 
online content that criticizes Islam (51% of non-users, 
48% of both light and heavy Internet users) though the 
percentage of people in Turkey who oppose such cen-
sorship is higher among light (33%) and heavy (35%) 
Internet users compared to non-users (24%). A simi-
lar pattern emerges when Turkish citizens are asked 
about online content that insults Turkish national val-
ues or history with pluralities of non-users (43%) and 
light Internet users (41%) supporting the censorship of 
such content and heavy Internet users evenly split on 
the issue (39% for censorship, 40% against).
Among people living in Turkey, support for the cen-
sorship of political content appears to be generally 
lower than support for censoring socio-cultural content 
across all three Internet use segments. Non-users are 
about evenly split (36% for censorship vs. 31% against) 
on whether to censor online content that damages a 
leader’s reputation while small pluralities of light users 
(37%) and heavy Internet users (45%) are against such 
censorship. Internet non-users are highly polarized on 
whether the government should censor online content 
used to organize anti-government protests (31% for 
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FIGURE 10: SUPPORT FOR RECENT GOVERNMENT RESTRICTIONS ON INTERNET 
BY PARTY SUPPORT (percentage of total respondents, single reponse) 
censorship and 36% against). In comparison there are 
about twice as many light (49% vs. 28%) and heavy 
Internet users (50% vs. 25%) opposed to censoring 
online content promoting anti-government protests as 
there are supporting it. 
Across all three Internet use segments there is little 
support among Turkish citizens for government cen-
sorship of online content that attacks the government 
or advocates for minority rights. About half of Inter-
net non-users (48%) oppose censoring content that 
advocates minority rights as compared to about one-
in-ive who favor it (22%). Majorities of light (57%) and 
heavy (57%) Internet users are also against censor-
ing online content that advocates for minority rights. 
Attitudes toward censoring online content that attacks 
the government exhibit a similar pattern with about half 
of non-users (47%) and light users (55%), and nearly 
two-thirds of heavy Internet users (64%), opposed to 
censorship of anti-government content posted online. 
Attitudes toward censorship not only vary signiicantly 
by frequency of Internet use but they also vary based 
on which political party Turkish citizens support as ex-
hibited in Table 6. Across political parties there is wide 
agreement that pornographic or sexually explicit con-
tent should be censored by the government (ranging 
from 55% to 78% across parties). However, the par-
ties divide across a liberal/conservative spectrum on 
whether online content criticizing Islam should be 
censored. A majority of AKP (61%) and MHP (61%) 
supporters agree that Internet content criticizing Islam 
should be banned while pluralities of CHP (47%) and 
HDP (44%) disagree. A similar liberal/conservative also 
divide emerges when considering online content that 
may insult Turkish national values or history. The major-
ity of MHP (60%) and AKP (52%) supporters agree the 
government should ban this content while about half of 
CHP (47%) and HDP (50%) supporters disagree. 
When it comes to online political content the parties 
also differ in important ways. Pluralities of AKP sup-
porters support banning content that damages political 
leaders’ reputations (46%) or is used to organize anti-
government protests (42%). In comparison, the three 
opposition parties disagree with censoring these types 
of content. Almost two-thirds (63%) of CHP supporters 
and pluralities of MHP (45%) and HDP (48%) dis-
agree with censoring content that is used to promote 
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TABLE 5: SUPPORT FOR GOVERNMENT CENSORSHIP OF SPECIFIC TYPES OF INTERNET CONTENT BY FREQUENCY 
OF INTERNET USE (percentage of total respondents, single reponse) 
Frequency of Internet Use
Type of Threat % of Non-Users
Agree/Disagree
% of Light Users
Agree/Disagree
% of Heavy Users
Agree/Disagree
Socio-Cultural Content
Pornographic or sexually explicit content 72 10 70 14 69 15
Criticizes Islam 51 24 48 33 48 35
Insults Turkish national values /history 43 28 41 33 39 40
Political Content
Damages political leaders’ reputation 36 31 30 37 31 45
Used to organize protests against the government 31 36 28 49 25 50
Attacks the government 25 47 20 55 22 64
Advocates minority rights 22 48 18 57  20 57
TABLE 6: SUPPORT FOR GOVERNMENT CENSORSHIP OF SPECIFIC TYPES OF INTERNET CONTENT BY PARTY SUP-
PORT (percentage of total respondents, single reponse) 
 
Party Support
Type of Content % of AKP
Agree/Dis-
agree
% of CHP
Agree/Dis-
agree
% of MHP 
Agree/Dis-
agree
% of HDP 
Agree/Dis-
agree
% of No 
Party Agree/
Disagree
Socio-Cultural Content
Pornographic or sexually explicit con-
tent
78 9 66 18 72 9 55 19 68 12
Criticizes Islam 61 19 38 43 61 20 33 44 49 20
Insults Turkish national values /history 52 23 30 47 60 18 20 50 35 36
Political Content
Damages political leaders’ reputation 46 24 19 57 30 41 29 41 26 38
Used to organize protests against the 
government
42 27 16 63 30 45 18 48 21 48
Attacks the government 30 42 15 70 18 62 18 60 20 57
Advocates minority rights 27 46 13 68 21 43 9 64 20 50
anti-government protests. Similarly, a majority of CHP 
supports (57%) and pluralities of MHP (41%) and HDP 
(41%) supporters oppose censoring content that may 
damage political leader’s reputations. 
However, there is agreement across the political spec-
trum that the Turkish government should not censor 
certain some types of political content. The majority of 
CHP (70%), MHP (62%), and HDP (60%) supporters 
and a plurality of AKP supporters (42%) are opposed to 
censoring online content that attacks the government. 
Opinion about online content that advocates minority 
rights in Turkey also exhibits a similar pattern with ma-
jorities of CHP (68%) and HDP (64%) supporters and 
pluralities of AKP (46%) and MHP (43%) disagreeing 
that this content should be censored.
The last set of questions regarding demand for Internet 
freedom paralleled the dimensions of Internet freedom 
measured by the Freedom House organization’s annual 
“Freedom of the Net” report.15 Freedom House scores 
countries on economic and legal obstacles to Internet 
15 See “Freedom of the Net 2014” report at https://freedomhouse.
org/report/freedom-net/freedom-net-2014
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Figure 11 illustrates that a large majority of Turkish 
citizens demand Internet freedom in each of the dimen-
sions queried. The greatest demand is for citizens to 
be free from government coercion and violence when 
expressing themselves online (63%) followed by online 
blogs and social media being free from government 
censorship (62%). These are followed by a majority 
agreeing that anyone in Turkey should be able have 
a presence online (60%) and that citizens should have 
access to government information online (58%). Only 
a small minority of Turkish citizens in each case (9-
10%) oppose these Internet freedoms. These opinion 
patterns are the same across a range of demographic 
characteristics including frequency of Internet use and 
political party support. 
FIGURE 11: DEMAND FOR POLITICAL, LEGAL, ECONOMIC INTERNET FREEDOM 
(percentage of total respondents, single reponse) 
access, violations of Internet user rights, and limits on 
online content.16 Survey respondents were asked their 
agreement with four statements: a) online blogs and 
social media criticizing the government should be free 
from government censorship, b) citizens should be free 
from coercion and violence when discussing and con-
veying controversial issues online, c) citizens should 
be free to access government information online, and 
d) anyone in Turkey should be able to have a website, 
blog, or share content online. Figure 11 below provides 
the distribution of agreement and disagreement with 
each statement across all respondents. 
16 See Freedom House rating methodology at https://freedom-
house.org/report/freedom-net/2014/methodology
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Perceived Supply of Turkish                         
Internet Freedom
As noted, in addition to questions asking Turkish citi-
zens how much they demand or value Internet freedom 
or support Internet censorship, the survey also asked 
respondents about their perceptions about how much 
the Internet is currently censored in Turkey and risks of 
political expression – or in other words the perceived 
supply of Internet freedom in Turkey.
The irst question asked of respondents was whether 
the Internet was free and open or censored, in their 
opinion, in Turkey? Out of all the respondents, 46% re-
sponded that it was very censored or censored, 25% 
responded that it was neither free nor censored, and 
30% responded that the Internet was very free or free in 
Turkey. However this evaluation of the overall amount 
of Internet freedom in Turkey varied substantially by 
frequency of Internet use segment as illustrated in Fig-
ure 12. 
Almost two-thirds (61%) of heavy Internet users per-
ceive the Internet in Turkey as very censored or 
censored as compared to about half (51%) of light In-
ternet users and one third (33%) of non-users. On the 
lip side, roughly the same size minorities of Internet 
non-users (31%), light users (31%), and heavy users 
(38%) view the Internet as very free or free.
However, as the Internet and social media have be-
come increasingly recognized as alternative means 
of information and political mobilization to the heavily 
government-inluenced mass media, Internet censor-
ship has become a rather politicized issue in Turkey. 
Therefore views on how much the Internet is free of 
government censorship diverge greatly across support-
ers of the major political parties in Turkey as exhibited 
in Figure 13. 
Almost half (47%) of AKP supporters perceive the Inter-
net as very free or free in Turkey while 29% believe that 
it is very censored or censored. These views are the 
complete opposite of those who support the opposition 
parties or no party at all. For instance, roughly two-
thirds of CHP (69%) and HDP (62%) supporters and 
about one-half of MHP (54%) and those that support no 
party (47%) perceive the Internet as very censored or 
censored. About a quarter or less (ranging from 15% of 
HDP supporters to 23% of MHP supporters) in each of 
these groups perceive the Internet as free or very free. 
This pattern of perceptions about Internet freedom in 
Turkey, in turn, may inluence Internet users’ perceived 
risk associated with online privacy and expressing their 
political opinions and beliefs online. The survey asked 
Turkish Internet users whether they agreed or disagreed 
with three statements that address such concerns: a) 
I avoid certain websites, blogs, online conversations, 
etc., due to online monitoring by the government, b) 
I am afraid to openly share with others online what I 
think about some political topics, c) I worry about my 
privacy when using commercial websites. 
About one-third (33%) of Turkish Internet users 
agree that they avoid certain websites, blogs, online 
conversations, etc., due to online monitoring by the 
government.  Nearly one third (30%) of Turkish citizens 
are also afraid to openly share with others online what 
they think about some political topics. However 41% 
of Internet users disagree they do so in each case. A 
larger percentage of Internet users agree they worry 
about their privacy when using commercial websites 
(44%) while a smaller proportion (29%) disagree that 
they worry about their privacy. 
However, across different political party supporters, 
these perceptions of risk vary greatly. The distribution 
of agreement and disagreement with each statement 
by political party support is exhibited in Table 7. As a 
pattern, AKP supporters perceived signiicantly less risk 
to online expression and privacy as compared to sup-
porters of the main opposition parties and those who 
support no party. Majorities of AKP supporters disagree 
that they avoid certain websites, blogs, and online con-
versations due to online monitoring by the government 
(52%) and are afraid to openly share with others online 
what they think about some political topics (54%) while 
about a quarter of AKP supporters (25% and 22%, re-
spectively) agree with either statement. 
CHP supporters, in comparison, are evenly divided 
(37% both agree and disagree) on whether they avoid 
certain websites, blogs, and online conversations due 
to online monitoring by the government. Likewise MHP 
supporters (37% agree vs. 43% disagree) and those 
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FIGURE 12: OVERALL PERCEIVED SUPPLY OF INTERNET FREEDOM BY
FREQUENCY OF INTERNET USE (percentage of total respondents, single reponse) 
who support no party (34% agree vs. 36% disagree) 
are also equally divided on this question. The excep-
tion are HDP supporters, who are primarily composed 
of ethnic Kurds, for whom 45% agree they avoid certain 
websites, blogs, and online conversations versus 26% 
disagree. 
Again a very similar pattern of opinions among support-
ers of the opposition parties and those who support no 
party emerge when considering fears of openly sharing 
with others online what they think about some politi-
cal topics. While 38% of CHP supporters disagree that 
they are afraid to share openly what they think about 
politics online another nearly third (32%) of CHP sup-
porters are afraid. Supporters of the MHP agree (36%) 
and disagree (34%) with this statement about equal 
numbers and so do those who do not support any 
party (34% agree vs. 35% disagree). HDP supporters 
are again those who perceive the most risk with 39% 
agreeing that they are afraid to openly share with oth-
ers online what they think about some political topics 
as compared to 23% who disagree. 
Interestingly, though not an overtly political context, 
AKP supporters are also the least likely to worry about 
their online privacy when using commercial websites 
(38%) as compared to CHP supporters (44%), MHP 
supporters (56%), HDP supporters (54%), and those 
who support no party (47%). Furthermore, they are the 
only group of political supporters who are more likely 
not to worry about their privacy online (41%) as com-
pared to the others for whom 17% to 28% reporting 
not worrying about their online privacy. In other words, 
the heavily Kurdish voters of the HDP appear to be 
worried about their privacy on the internet while the 
AKP constituency is more relaxed about these risks. 
The last set of questions querying respondents’ per-
ceived supply of Internet freedom again parallels the 
dimensions of Internet freedom measured by the Free-
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FIGURE 13: OVERALL PERCEIVED SUPPLY OF INTERNET FREEDOM BY 
POLITICAL PARTY SUPPORT (percentage of total respondents, single reponse) 
TABLE 7: PERCEIVED RISKS TO ONLINE PRIVACY AND EXPRESSION (percentage of Internet users only, 
single reponse) 
 
Party Support
Type of Risk % of AKP
Agree/
Disagree
% of CHP
Agree/
Disagree
% of MHP 
Agree/
Disagree
% of HDP 
Agree/
Disagree
% of No 
Party Agree/
Disagree
I avoid certain websites, blogs, online 
conversations due to online monitoring 
by the government
25 52 37 37 37 43 45 26 34 36
I am afraid to openly share with others 
online what I think about some political 
topics
22 54 32 38 36 34 39 23 34 35
I worry about my privacy when using 
commercial websites.
38 41 44 28 56 24 54 17 47 20
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FIGURE 14: PERCEIVED SUPPLY OF POLITICAL, LEGAL, ECONOMIC INTERNET 
FREEDOM (percentage of total respondents, single reponse) 
dom House organization.  These survey items closely 
match the wording of the same questions tapping Turk-
ish citizens’ demand for Internet freedom from the 
previous section. 
Survey respondents were asked how much they agreed 
or disagreed with each of the following statements de-
scribing the Internet in Turkey: a) the government does 
not prevent citizens from criticizing the government in 
online blogs and social media, b) citizens are free from 
coercion and violence when discussing and conveying 
controversial issues online, c) the Internet allows free 
and open access to government information, and d) 
anyone in Turkey may have a website, blog, or share 
content online. Figure 14 provides the distribution of 
agreement and disagreement with each statement 
across all respondents. 
Turkish citizens are heavily polarized in their percep-
tion of how much Internet freedom they possess across 
three of the dimensions. For instance, roughly a third 
of  people residing in Turkey (32%) agree that citizens 
are free from coercion and violence when discussing 
and conveying controversial issues online while the 
same percentage (32%) disagree with this evaluation 
and 35% neither agree nor disagree. Similar patterns 
of opinion exist when considering whether the Internet 
allows free and open access to government informa-
tion (33% agree vs. 30% disagree) and the government 
does not prevent citizens from criticizing the govern-
ment in online blogs and social media (39% agree vs. 
30% agree). However, when it comes to ownership and 
the ability to publish online about twice the percentage 
of Turkish citizens (40%) agree that anyone in Turkey 
may have a website, blog, or share content online as 
those who disagree (19%). 
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TABLE 8: PERCEIVED SUPPLY OF POLITICAL, LEGAL, ECONOMIC INTERNET FREEDOM BY POLITICAL PARTY SUP-
PORT (percentage of Internet users only, single reponse) 
Party Support
Type of Internet Freedom % of AKP
Agree/
Disagree
% of CHP
Agree/
Disagree
% of MHP 
Agree/
Disagree
% of HDP 
Agree/
Disagree
% of No 
Party Agree/
Disagree
Citizens free from coercion and vio-
lence when discussing controversial 
issues online
42 21 27 40 26 36 32 35 23 42
The Internet allows free and open ac-
cess to govt. information
43 21 29 38 27 33 32 31 24 38
The govt. does not prevent citizens 
from criticizing the govt. in online blogs 
and social media
44 23 36 36 43 33 40 30 31 34
Anyone in Turkey may have a website, 
blog, or share content online
45 15 40 20 45 16 33 24 33 23
Yet, as we have seen in other areas of perceived 
supply of Internet freedom, there also exists a large 
perceptual divide on the amount of Internet freedom 
Turkish citizens enjoy across supporters of different po-
litical parties. Table 8 illustrates the political polarization 
around evaluation of Internet freedom in Turkey. 
Supporters of the political parties are most polarized 
around perceptions of whether citizens are free from 
coercion and violence when discussing controversial 
issues online and the ability to freely access govern-
ment information online. The plurality (42%) of AKP 
supporters agree that citizens are free from coercion 
and violence when expressing themselves online while 
a small percentage disagree (21%). Pluralities of AKP 
supporters also agree that the Internet allows free and 
open access to government information (43%) and he 
government does not prevent citizens from openly criti-
cizing the government online (44%) while percentages 
of AKP supporters also disagree with these views (21% 
and 23%, respectively).
In contrast, the perceptions of the supporters of the 
major opposition parties and those with no party afili-
ation are the mirror image of AKP supporters when it 
comes to evaluations of how much political and legal 
Internet freedom exists in Turkey. For instance, plurali-
ties of CHP (40%), MHP (36%), HDP (35%) supporters 
and those without party afiliation (42%) all disagree 
with the view that citizens are free from coercion and 
violence when expressing themselves online. 
Pluralities of CHP (38%) and MHP (33%) supporters 
and those who do not identify with a party (38%) also 
disagree that the Internet allows open and free access 
to government information. Compared to the AKP, the 
opposition party supporters and unafiliated also dis-
agree at higher percentages (36% CHP, 33% MHP, 
30% HDP, 34% unafiliated) that the citizens are not 
prevented from criticizing the government online. 
One area of consensus among supporters of the AKP 
(40%), CHP (40%), and MHP (45%) is that anyone in 
Turkey may have a website, blog, or share content 
online. However, supporters of the primarily ethnic 
Kurdish HDP party are substantially less likely to agree 
with this view (33%) as well as those who do not sup-
port any party (33%). 
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Democratic Deficit in Turkish Internet 
 Freedoms
FIGURE 15: DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT OF POLITICAL, LEGAL, ECONOMIC INTERNET 
FREEDOMS BY FREQUENCY OF INTERNET USE (percentage of total respondents, 
single reponse) 
By comparing Turkish citizens’ demand for political, 
legal, and economic Internet freedoms to their evalu-
ations of perceived supply of the same freedoms, we 
are able to chart the size of the democratic deicit in 
Internet freedom within Turkey. We do so by subtract-
ing the measures of perceived supply (scored on a ive 
point Likert scale that ranges from strongly disagree 
to strongly agree) from our measures of demand for 
Internet freedom measured on the same scale for each 
dimension of Internet freedom. 
The resulting scores will range from -4 to +4. If a posi-
tive score results, then demand outweighs perceived 
supply and a democratic deicit exists. If the score is 
zero then demand and perceived supply are in equi-
librium and a negative score means that there is an 
abundance of Internet freedom in the eyes of the re-
spondent. The resulting mean scores for each of the 
four dimensions of Internet freedom we queried by In-
ternet use segments and all respondents are displayed 
in Figure 15.
Page 30
BENCHMARKING DEMAND: TURKEY’S CONTESTED INTERNET                                                                                              OCTOBER 2015
FIGURE 16:  GLOBAL INTERNET FREEDOM DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT BY POLITICAL 
PARTY SUPPORY (percentage of total respondents, single reponse) 
As a whole respondents experience the largest dem-
ocratic deicits (the gap between how much Turkish 
citizens want Internet freedom versus how much Inter-
net freedom they think they possess) about freedom 
from coercion and violence when discussing contro-
versial issues online (all respondents mean =.7) and 
freedom to openly access government information 
online (all respondents mean=.7). The lowest mean 
democratic deicit is for the freedom to have a website, 
blog, or share content online (mean=.4).
Not surprisingly, heavy Internet users experience the 
highest democratic deicits in Internet freedom with 
mean deicit scores across all four areas ranging be-
tween .7 and 1.0, especially the freedom from coercion 
and violence when engaging in online discussions 
and the freedom to access government information 
online. Non-users of the Internet perceive very little 
democratic deicit in regards to Internet freedoms with 
their mean scores ranging from one-third (mean=.3) to 
one-half (mean=.5) of heavy Internet users. In general, 
light users’ democratic deicits are also small with their 
mean scores mirroring those of non-users more so 
than heavy users and range from .3 to .7.
By summing and then averaging respondents’ scores 
for the four Internet freedoms into one overall index 
of Turkish demand for Internet freedom and doing the 
same for perceived supply of Internet freedom, and 
then again subtracting the overall supply from overall 
demand, we may assess the global democratic deicit 
that Turkish citizens experience on the issue of Internet 
freedom. Furthermore, we also can chart this overall 
score by political party support in order to evaluate how 
Internet freedom democratic deicits vary by political af-
iliation as exhibited in Figure 16. 
The mean global democratic deicit in Internet free-
dom experienced by all respondents is .6 based on 
these calculations. AKP supporters experience a 
very low democratic deicit with their deicit close to 
zero (mean=.2) where their demand for Internet free-
dom closely equals their perceived supply of Internet 
freedom. In contrast, the mean democratic deicit in 
Internet freedom for CHP supporters is ive times as 
high (mean=1.0) as AKP supporters. Similarly the 
democratic deicit for MHP supporters (mean=.8), HDP 
supporters (mean=.7), and the unafiliated (mean=.8) 
are about four times as large as AKP supporters.
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Internet Blockage and Circumvention
In March 2014 the Turkish government put a politically 
controversial block initially on Twitter and then later on 
YouTube within Turkey.17 President Erdogan, prime 
minister at the time, publicly vowed to “wipe out” Twitter 
as it had been used to release politically damaging al-
legations against him and his associates shortly before 
the March 2014 local elections in Turkey.18 Informa-
tion on how to circumvent these blockages was widely 
publicized online, on posters, in newspapers, and even 
on sides of buildings until the blockages of each were 
lifted over a month later.19
Therefore we asked survey respondents a series of 
questions about their familiarity and attitudes about 
these Internet blockages and whether Internet us-
ers engaged in any Internet circumvention behaviors. 
Respondents were irst asked two questions: a) how 
familiar they were with the Turkish government block-
ing the social media platform Twitter on March 20, 2014 
and b) how familiar they were with the Turkish govern-
ment blocking the video posting and streaming website 
YouTube on March 27, 2014. 
Figure 17 provides the percentages of Turkish citizens 
who know a great deal, are familiar but do not know all 
the details, have heard something about it, and those 
who never heard about/were not aware of the block-
age. Roughly a quarter of the Turkish public report 
knowing a great deal about the YouTube (21%) and 
Twitter (25%) blockages that began in March 2014. An-
other roughly quarter of Turkish citizens is familiar with 
the blockages (24% for each platform) but did not know 
all the details. The remainder of respondents, compris-
ing a bit over half the population, had heard something 
(26% for YouTube and 24% for Twitter) or nothing at all 
(29% for YouTube and 26% for Twitter). 
17 “Turkey blocks YouTube days after Twitter crackdown,” Gul 
Tuysuz and Ivan Watson, CNN, 28 March 2014, Retrieved from 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/27/world/europe/turkey-youtube-
blocked/
18 “Twitter is blocked in Turkey as Erdogan vows to ‘wipe out’ 
the social network,” Agencies, The Telegraph, 21 March 2014, 
Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
europe/turkey/10713393/Twitter-is-blocked-in-Turkey-as-Erdo-
gan-vows-to-wipe-out-the-social-network.html 
19 “Circumventing the Turkish Twitter crackdown,” Hari Sreeniva-
san, PBS Newshour, 22 March 2014, Retrieved from http://
www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/circumventing-turkish-twitter-
crackdown/
However awareness of the bans varied substantially 
by frequency of Internet usage. Half (50%) of heavy 
Internet users and 20% of light Internet users report-
ed knowing a great deal about the blockage of Twitter 
compared to 8% of non-users. For the YouTube block-
age the pattern was the same with 42% of heavy and 
20% of light Internet users reporting knowing a great 
deal about the YouTube ban compared to 6% of non-
users. 
What about users of these two social media platforms? 
Twitter (40% of Turkish Internet users) and YouTube 
(57% of Turkish Internet users) users had a much 
greater awareness of the blockages. Over half (54%) 
of Twitter users reported knowing a great deal and 
another 28% reported being familiar about the Twitter 
blockage in Turkey. A smaller percentage of YouTube 
users (44%) reported knowing a great deal about the 
YouTube ban in Turkey and 28% of YouTube users re-
ported being familiar with the ban but not knowing all 
the details.
Our second set of questions asked respondents 
whether they personally approve or disapprove of the 
government blocking each platform or if it was hard to 
tell. The results for all respondents are displayed in Fig-
ure 18.
About half of all people residing in Turkey strongly 
disapprove/disapprove of both the Twitter (47%) and 
YouTube (45%) blockages by the Turkish government. 
At the same time a small percentage of Turkish citizens 
(16%) each support the banning of these two platforms. 
The remaining roughly third of Turkish citizens in each 
case either neither approved nor disapproved of the 
bans or replied it was too dificult to tell. 
The blockage of Twitter and YouTube were deeply un-
popular among heavy Internet users with nearly 70% of 
heavy users in each case (69% and 68%, respectively) 
strongly disapproving/disapproving of the bans. Like-
wise 73% of Twitter users opposed the Twitter blockage 
and 63% of YouTube users strongly disapproved/dis-
approved of the government blocking YouTube. The 
plurality of non-Internet users in each case had no 
opinion (45% for each platform) though sizable per-
centages (29% for Twitter and 28% for YouTube) did 
strongly disapprove/disapprove of the blockages.
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FIGURE 17:  FAMILIARITY WITH MARCH 2014 TWITTER AND YOUTUBE BLOCK-
AGES  (percentage of total respondents, single reponse) 
As the blockage of Twitter and YouTube by the AKP 
dominated government was deeply politicized we 
also cross-tabulated the percentages of people living 
in Turkey who either approved or disapproved of the 
blockages by political party support. The results are 
provided in Table 9.
The blockage of these two social media platforms was 
deeply polarizing, not only between supporters of the 
ruling AKP party and the opposition parties but also 
among AKP supporters themselves. A plurality of AKP 
supporters (29% in each case) favored the government 
blocking Twitter and YouTube but at the same time 
nearly a quarter of AKP supporters (24% for Twitter and 
23% for YouTube) also opposed the bans in each case. 
Disapproval of the blockages was very high among 
supporters of the opposition parties and those with no 
party afiliation while at same time approval was ex-
tremely low. Nearly three-fourth of CHP supporters 
(72% in each case) disapproved of the blockages as 
well as majorities of MHP (52% for Twitter and 50% 
for YouTube) and HDP (61% for Twitter and 57% for 
YouTube) supporters and those with no party afiliation 
(56% for Twitter and 53% for YouTube).
Beyond disapproval of the blockages, we also asked 
Internet users if they circumvented the government ban 
of either, or both, YouTube or Twitter while they were 
blocked. Figure 19 provides the percentage of Turkish 
Internet users who did or did not circumvent the block-
ages and their reported frequency of circumvention.
The vast majority (84%) of Turkish Internet users did 
not circumvent the blockages of either YouTube or 
Twitter. However, a small minority of Internet users 
(17% total) did circumvent the blockages to access ei-
ther YouTube or Twitter with 8% reporting they did so 
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Party Support
Blocked Platform % of AKP
Agree/
Disagree
% of CHP
Agree/
Disagree
% of MHP 
Agree/
Disagree
% of HDP 
Agree/
Disagree
% of No 
Party Agree/
Disagree
Twitter 29 24 7 72 7 52 3 61 11 56
YouTube 29 23 7 72 5 50 4 57 10 53
FIGURE 18:  APPROVAL AND DISAPPROVAL WITH MARCH 2014 TWITTER AND 
YOUTUBE BLOCKAGES (percentage of total respondents, single reponse)
TABLE 9: APPROVAL AND DISAPPROVAL WITH MARCH 2014 TWITTER AND YOUTUBE BLOCKAGES BY POLITICAL 
PARTY SUPPORT (percentage of all respondents, single reponse) 
occasionally, 4% reporting they did so a fair amount, 
and 5% reporting the did all the time. 
We also examined the frequency of circumvention be-
havior among Twitter and YouTube users speciically 
with the results depicted in Figure 20. Though about 
three-fourths of Twitter (76%) and YouTube (79%) us-
ers did not circumvent the blockages, the frequency 
of circumvention behavior was higher as compared to 
Internet users in general. All in all about a quarter of 
Twitter users (24%) circumvented the blockages with 
9% doing so occasionally, 6% a fair amount, and 9% 
doing so all the time. YouTube users circumvented the 
Internet to a lesser degree (21% total) with 10% doing 
so occasionally, 4% a fair amount, and 7% doing so all 
the time. 
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FIGURE 19:  APPROVAL AND DISAPPROVAL WITH MARCH 2014 TWITTER AND 
YOUTUBE BLOCKAGES (percentage of Internet users only, single reponse) 
FIGURE 20:  PERCENTAGE OF TWITTER AND YOUTTUBE USERS THAT CIRCUM-
VENTED YOUTUBE & TWITTER BANS (percentage of Twitter and YouTube users 
only, single reponse) 
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Study Methodology
The survey population were adults living in the Republic of Turkey (men and women, 18 years or older).The data for 
this analysis was collected through a national, face-to-face, general population household survey of Turkey conducted 
over a six-week period between December 20, 2014 and February 2, 2015. The sample was a random stratiied, clus-
tered sample with stratiication applied in two levels based on the total population of Turkish census region and the 
urban/rural population within each region, with clusters containing 20 households. The Turkish government’s census 
agency randomly selected clusters and households for the survey. Survey interviewers contacted 2111 households 
with one survey respondent randomly selected within each household without replacement. The response rate was 
55% for a total of 1161 completed survey interviews. The margin of error (MOE) does not exceed +/-2.9% at a 95% 
conidence level for reported results for the entire population, +/- 3.7% at a 95% conidence level for reported results 
for Internet users, and +/- 3.7% at a 95% conidence level for reported results of non-users of the Internet.
